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CASE COMMENTS
INCOME TAX: LEASE-OPTION AGREEMENTS
Osterreichv. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1955)
A taxpayer executed a written agreement authorizing the use of
certain lots by a corporation. The instrument, entitled "lease," referred to the parties as lessor and lessee and contained other stipulations ordinarily found in a lease. Rentals were payable over the 68year term of the lease, with an option in the lessee to purchase for
the nominal sum of ten dollars at the end of the term. In a deficiency
action the Tax Court held that the agreement was a lease and that
the payments received by the taxpayer constituted ordinary income.
On appeal, HELD, since the parties intended a sale and the lessee acquired an equity in the property, a sale had taken place. Judgment
reversed.
When a lease contains an option to purchase, the question arises
as to whether it will be considered for tax purposes to be an installment
sales contract rather than a lease. The applicable Internal Revenue
Code provision allows a rental deduction to the lessee only "if re
quired to be made as a condition to the continued use or possession.
for purposes of the trade or business, of property to which the taxpayer has not taken or is not taking title or in which he has no equity."'
Since title is not conveyed until the option is exercised, the issue is
whether the lessee acquires an equity in the property during the term
of the lease. If an equity is acquired, the instrument will be treated as
a sale contract; the payments will not be deductible to the lessee as
rent 2 but must be treated as a capital expenditure. Accordingly, the
seller-lessor must, to the extent of increase over capital investment,
3
treat his receipts as capital gain rather than ordinary income.
In determining whether an equity in the property has been acquired, the courts usually look to the intent of the parties.4 In 1928 the
lINT. REv. CODE of 1954, §162 (a) (3).
2Holeproof Hosiery Co., 11 B.T.A. 547 (1928).
3INT. Rxv. CODE of 1954, §61; see, e.g., Estate of Clarence B. Eaton, 10 T.C.
869 (1948); Lincoln D. Godshall, 13 T.C. 681 (1949).
4Helvering v. Lazarus & Co., 308 U.S. 252 (1939); Jefferson Gas Coal Co. v.
Commissioner, 52 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1931); accord, Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U.S. 664 (1876).
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Tax Court deviated from this general rule and applied an objective
test in holding that the lessee had acquired an equity in the property.5
The court concluded, without considering the business advantages of
leasing,6 that when the total rental payments plus the option price
exceed the original cost of the property the lessee acquires something
of value that constitutes "a certain equity." This test was reiterated in
the Chicago Stoker Corp. case,7 in which the Tax Court held that,
since the payments under the lease exceeded the depreciation and
value of the property, the lessee had acquired an equity.
The trend toward an objective test was reversed in Benton v. Commissioner8 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in overruling
the Tax Court, stated that the intent of the parties at the time of
the agreement is controlling and that the economic effect of the agreement is only one factor in ascertaining the intent of the parties.
Several economic factors, any of which may result in a lease-option
contract being considered a sale, have been crucial in ascertaining the
intent of the parties:
(1) The lessee will acquire title upon the completion of rental
payments and termination of the lease, 9 or upon the exer1
cise of an option at a nominal price.O
(2) The option price is less than the expected fair market
value of the property at the time the option is to be exercised," or is a relatively small amount compared to total
12
payments.
(3) The rental payments are to be applied against the purchase
3
price.1
5Holeproof Hosiery Co., 11 B.T.A. 547, 556 (1928); see also Judson Mills, 11
T.C. 25 (1948).
oGriesinger, Pros and Cons of Leasing Equipments, 33 HARv. Bus. Rav. 75 (No.
2) (1955).
714 T.C. 441 (1950).
8197 F.2d 745 (1952).
9See, e.g., Chicago Stoker Corp., 14 T.C. 441 (1950); Helser Machine and Marine
Works, Inc., 39 B.T.A. 644 (1939).
loSee, e.g., Watson v. Commissioner, 62 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1932); Jefferson Gas
Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 52 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1931).
"'See, e.g., Holeproof Hosiery Co., 11 B.T.A. 547 (1928). But see Benton v.
Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952).
"2See, e.g., Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25 (1948).
"sSee, e.g., Rotorite Corp. v. Commissioner, 117 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1951);
William A. Mclgaters, P-H 1950 T.C. Mem. Dec. f5o,152.
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(4) All or part of the rental payment is specified as or is the
equivalent of interest. 1
(5) The rents exceed the fair rental value of the property. 15
The Internal Revenue Service has issued a ruling that refers
to the sale or lease of equipment; this ruling, also applicable to
realty, 6 states:: 7
"Whether an agreement, which in form is a lease, is in substance a conditional sales contract depends upon the intent of
the parties as evidenced by the provisions of the agreement,
read in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time
the agreement was executed. In ascertaining such intent no
single test, or any special combination of tests, is absolutely
determinative. No general rule . . . can be laid down. Each
case must be decided in the light of its particular facts."
The instant case was decided shortly after this ruling was issued
and may foreshadow the method of treating such a transaction, even
though the court did not cite the ruling. The ruling states that
intent as evidenced by the agreement, read in the light of facts and
circumstances existing when the agreement was made, is decisive. It
goes on to indicate that the presence of one or more of the economic
factors set out above will have a persuasive bearing on the question
of intent. In concluding that this agreement was a sale, the court
looked both to the economic effect of the agreement and to the intent of the parties as evidenced by surrounding facts and circumstances. That the parties intended a sale was supported by a finding,
based on the economic effect of the agreement, that the lessee had
acquired an equity. Thus the instant case is apparently in accord
with the revenue ruling and may indicate the beginning of a uniform
administrative and judicial approach to the problem.
DONALD R. CORBETr
14See, e.g., Judson Mills, 11 T.C. 25 (1948); Robert A. Taft, 27 B.T.A. 808

(1933).
15See, e.g., Truman Bowen, 12 T.C. 446

(1949); Holeproof Hosiery Co., 11

B.TA. 547 (1928).
16The courts have made no distinction between real and personal property;
see Breece Veneer and Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956);
Gilken Corp., 10 T.C. 445 (1948).
'7Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 Cum. BuLL. 39, 41.
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